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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PUBLIC'S (MIXED) PERCEPTION OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND THE PROFESSION'S (MIXED) RESPONSE
Readers who are holding in their hands an Article written for a law review
symposium on "professionalism" probably need little or no convincing that the
reputations of American lawyers and of the justice system as a whole have been in
* B.A., Harvard College, 1966 (with honors); J.D., Rutgers Law School-Newark 1969 (with
highesthonors). Reporter, The Professional Reform Initiative (PRI) oftheNational Conference of Bar
Presidents (NCBP); President, The William Hodes, P.C., Indianapolis, Indiana; Professor Emeritus of
Law, Indiana University.
Although I was invited by the Editors of the South Carolina Law Review to contribute this Article
because of my position as Reporter for PRI, the Article expresses my views, and is not an official PRI
document or report. Nor does it express views approved or endorsed by the NCBP, which sponsors and
presents diverse programs of interest to bar leaders without necessarily reviewing or approving the
content ofthose programs. When I do quote orparaphrase public documents ormaterials issuedbyPRI,
however, I have taken care to note that I am doing so.
I would like to thank Professor Roy Stuckey of the University of South Carolina School of Law
for taking an interest in the work of PRI and insisting that this Article be written, to the staff of the
South Carolina Law Review, especially Stewart McQueen, Tom Andrews, Cordes Ford, and Neil
Batavia for providing research assistance in addition to normal editorial work, and to the members of
the PI for allowing me to participate in their splendid endeavor.
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steady decline for many years.' Although the public's sentiment about lawyers has
been more positive at certain times during the history of our country, 2 this
manifestly is not one of those times. Survey after survey of public opinion shows
lawyers gradually slipping below politicians and journalists, and even approaching
car salesmen and advertising executive levels in the public's esteem?
It will also come as no surprise to most readers that this well-documented
decline in public respect is in significant measure attributable to the public's sense
that lawyers are not trustworthy.4 Or, to put less fine a point on it, that too many
lawyers lie too much. For example, the premise of the popular filmLiarLiar is that
lawyers must lie in order to function as lawyers; a lawyer who has a spell cast on
him and cannot lie is effectively struck dumb. This premise no doubt resonated with
members of the audience, and it is hard to image anyone in contemporary America
wondering why the main character was cast as a lawyer rather than as an architect
or a biologist. Sadly, this is the film version of the joke that one can tell whether a
lawyer is lying by checking to see if his lips are moving. Sadder still, the public
already knows the punch line.
Beyond outright lying-and putting to one side traits that might be linked to
other professionals, such as greed, arrogance, and limited ability to communicate
with laymen-the public is also dismayed by what it regards as other manifestations
1. See, e.g., Symposium, Improving the Professionalism of Lawyers: Can Commissions,
Committees, and Centers Make a Difference?, 52 S.C. L. REv. 443 passim (2001)[hereinafter
Professionalism Symposium]; Susan Daicoff, LawyerKnow Thyself: A Review ofEmpiricalResearch
on Attorney Attributes Bearing on Professionalism, 46 AM. U. L. REv. 1337, 1344 & n.15 (1997)
(listing various commentators who agree with the proposition that professionalism displayed by
attorneys has declined dramatically in the last twenty-five years).
2. See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 211-39 (R.H. Helmholz &
Bernard D. Reams, Jr., eds., William S. Hein & Co., 1980) (1911) (describing the sudden revival of
public distrust of lawyers after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War).
3. See, e.g., The Gallup Organization, Honesty/Ethics in Professions, athttp://www.gallup.com/
poll/topics/hnstyethcs.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2002) (listing results for the 2001 poll); see also
Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks: Professionalism, Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at
467-68 & n.56 (providing further support for this proposition); Chris Klein, Poll: Lawyers Not Liked,
NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A6 (noting that the prestige of lawyers has plummeted during the past
twenty years); Randall Samborn, Tracking Trends, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 9,1993, at 20, 20 (tracing various
polls since 1976 dealing with the public's declining respect for lawyers). A recent article summarized
Gallup Poll results from 1976 to 1998 dealing with honesty and ethics in the legal profession. Michael
Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REv. 533, 539-40 & nn.34-35 (2000). According to
these polls, 25-27% of those polled gave lawyers high or very high ratings for honesty and ethics
between the years of 1976 and 1985. Id. at 539. That figure fell to 18% in 1988, rose slightly during the
years of 1989 and 1991, dropped back to 18% in 1992, and eventually reached 14% in 1998. Id. at 539-
40.
4. See sources cited supra note 3; see also Gary A. Hengstler, VoxPopuli: The PublicPerception
ofLawyers: ABA Poll, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60,62 (noting that barely one in five people surveyed
described the legal profession as honest and ethical).
5. LIAR LIAR (Universal Pictures 1997).
[Vol. 53: 527
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of lawyer deviousness: evasion, obfuscation, misdirection, "spinning,"6 and all
manner of"loophole lawyering," to say nothing of willingness to advance frivolous
claims or defenses.7
At the same time, other less well-known surveys show that more focused
questions about the attributes of individual lawyers-especially the lawyer of the
person responding to the survey-yield less bleak results.' After all, when one's
own lawyer is busily "taking advantage of loopholes and technicalities," it is much
easier to think kindly of the practice, and to re-characterize it as "standing up for
a client's rights," whether in criminal, civil, or transactional matters. Moreover, the
public has some awareness of the historical role that lawyer-statesmen in both the
public and private sectors have played in fashioning and operating our great
6. Public consciousness of this form of"lying" most commonly arises in connection with closing
arguments in high profile criminal cases. (The lawyer joke version features a defendant charged with
sodomy whose lawyer argued to the jury that at most his client was guilty of the traffic offense of
"following too closely.") Among the best known real examples are the insinuation in the O.J. Simpson
criminal trial that the defendant's post-arrest blood samples had been sprinkled at the crime scene or
substituted in the crime lab, and the argument in the Reginald Denny assault case arising from the riot
that followed the acquittal in state courtofpolice officers who had beaten ex-convictRodney King, that
one of the defendants had actually been trying toprotect the victim from assault by others (by holding
him down with a foot on his neck, as the videotape of the incident clearly showed).
But see William Hodes, Rethinking the Way Law is Taught: Can We Improve Lawyer
Professionalism by TeachingHired Guns ToAim Better?, 87 KY.LJ. 1019,1033-34 (1999) [hereinafter
Hodes, Aim Better] (arguing that such tactics ought to be considered legitimate and even mandatory in
the service of a client, because the lawyers are not testifying falsely-which would indeed be
"lying"--but merely making arguments that the government is free to counter, and that the jurors are
free to reject). See also Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at 538-39 (comments by Professor
Jack Sammons distinguishing between a duty to be honest about "brute facts," and a duty to be
"forthcoming"). The former is well established under existing rules ofprofessional ethics, whereas the
latter not only does not exist, but cannot exist under our adversary system as it is currently constituted
(at least at the trial level).
Although the author of the Aim Better article (and this Article) is now the Reporter for the PRI,
the above distinction between testifying falsely and making arguments that the lawyer hopes will lead
someone else to a false conclusion is not a distinction that PRI endorses. Indeed, as will be seen, it is
probably fair to say that the most difficult issue PRI faces, both as a matter ofpolicy and as a matter of
tactics, is how broadly or narrowly to define the "lying" that it seeks to eliminate from the legal
profession, and even then, which forms of lawyer dishonesty deserve the most immediate attention. See
infra Parts II, III.
7. Even though it is now several years old, the case of the elderly New Mexico woman who
recovered a large compensatory andpunitive damagesjury award from McDonald's Restaurants, after
spilling a scalding hot cup of take-out coffee on her lap while driving, still resonates with the public,
includingsocial critics and television comics. ButseeHodes,Aim Bettersupra note 6, at 1035-36 n.43
(agreeing that lawyers are forbidden-by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.1, for example-from advancing frivolous claims, but suggesting thatthe
claim in question might not have been frivolous, taking into account the track record of that particular
restaurant chain, and the failure of the court to grant summary judgment for the defendant).
8. See, e.g., Leonard E. Gross, The Public Hates Lawyers: Why Should We Care?, 29 SErON
HALL L. REv. 1405, 1417 & n.60 (1999) (citing two surveys for the proposition that "people's
disparaging attitudes toward lawyers in general has not caused them to lose confidence in their own
lawyers"); Marc Galanter, The Faces ofMistrust: The Image ofLawyers in Public Opinion, Jokes, and
Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 805, 808 & nn.12-19 (1998) (summarizing results of polls
indicating that over 50% of adults are satisfied with the services that their lawyers provide).
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democracy-9 -from the Founding Fathers forward, including such events as the
development of the administrative state during the New Deal, and the civil rights
movement that began in the 1950s.
If one takes a weighted average of public sentiment, however, or somehow
finds its center of gravity, it is clear that the contemporary overall verdict is
negative. Moreover, even if this public vote of no confidence were based on wholly
erroneous or fanciful considerations, the situation would still be intolerable for
those who care about the legal profession, and would still cry out for remedy. In our
constitutional democracy, where lawyers are the chief means of access to the legal
system with respect to both public disputes and private transactions, the rule of law
itself is at risk if lawyers are bypassed as not sufficiently respected to play this
crucial role.°
Over the past twenty years or so, the organized bar has responded in a variety
of ways to the challenges that the public and critics within the legal
profession-including academic critics-have laid down. Some bar leaders have
claimed that the public's disaffection with lawyers dates back to the founding of our
country and before, and is in any event based largely on lack of understanding of
what lawyers do, and why they do what they do." Furthermore, the public is largely
ignorant, it is said, of the positive contributions that lawyers make to society
generally, even beyond the indispensable work they perform for their clients (who
collectively make up our body politic in any event).'2
9. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
11-13 (1993).
10. This was the essential point of the National Conference on Public Trust and Confidence in the
Justice System, which was held in May 1999 in Washington, D.C. Approximately 500 delegates
attended the conference, which wasjointly sponsored by the Conference of ChiefJustices, the American
Bar Association (ABA), the League of Women Voters, and the Conference of State Court
Administrators. See http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ptc/ptc2.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
One of the co-chairs of the Conference was Thomas A. Zlaket, Chief Justice of the Arizona
Supreme Court. As will be seen, Chief Justice Zlaket soon became one of the prime movers in the
formation of the Professional Reform Initiative and is still one of its most active members and
spokesmen. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. It is probably correct, therefore, to count the
1999 Conference as one of several inspirational points for the development of PRI.
11. See generally PAuL G. HASKELL, WHY LAWYERS BEHAVE As THEY Do (1998) (explaining
the professional rules that permit or require certain conduct by lawyers that laypersons may find
unethical); STEVEN LUBET, NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH-WHY TRIAL LAWYERS DON'T, CAN'T, AND
SHOULDN'T HAVE TO TELL THE WHOLE TRuTH (2001) (demonstrating that lawyer storytelling is a
legitimate technique fordetermining truth, and forproviding thebest defense for a client). Both ofthese
books were written by law professors, but largely for a lay audience.
12. See, e.g., Paul J. Kelly, Jr., A Return of Professionalism, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2091, 2096
(1998) ("1 do look forward to the day when the public ... stop[s] blaming the profession for the
perceived ills afflicting our society and recognize[s] the contribution that the American legal system
and the American lawyers have made and continue to make not only to the American people but to the
world at large."); Deborah L. Rhode, The Professionalism Problem, 39 WM. & MARYL.REv. 283,289
(1998) ("Theprofession's most common response to popular criticism is to deny its validity. Overhalf
ofsome 2800 surveyed lawyersjudges, and law students believe that thepublic's negativeperception
of the profession is 'due to its ignorance .... ') (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 53: 527
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For those who take this view of the problem of declining respect for lawyers
and of the justice system itself, a solid countermeasure is to engage in public
relations campaigns designed to educate the public about just such matters, and to
improve the image of lawyers in the process. That is a chief reason why there are
so many local, state, and national initiatives, including non-binding codes, creeds,
and "rules of the road," exhorting lawyers to practice various forms of civility and
professionalism, and to preach to fellow lawyers along the same lines.'3
Another approachis to remind members of the public that they may themselves
have need of legal services in the future, and that when that day comes, they too
will want and deserve the protection and the freedom of action that engaging a good
lawyer brings. After all, one man's "hired gun Rambo lawyer" is another man's
"hard-nosed and loyal advocate," as suggested earlier, "a champion against ahostile
world."' 4 Or, as Sir Thomas More famously challenged William Roper, a man with
little imagination and an all consuming rectitude, saying:
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to
coast-man's laws, not God's-and if you cut them down-and
you're just the man to do it-d'you really think you could stand
upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil
benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.'"
Still another approach, favored by bar leaders worried about the legal
profession's image, is to remind the public about the various pro bono publico
efforts mounted by many individual lawyers, law firms, and local bar associations,
as well as other community programs such as volunteer work with the elderly,
prison inmates, immigrants, and "ask a lawyer" hotlines and educational programs
about the law presented at the grade school and high school levels.
To be sure, professionalism and community service programs have been
criticized by some as little more than late-arriving and ultimately self-serving
window dressing and by others as not addressing directly enough public complaints
about our profession. 6 More significantly, perhaps, still others have suggested that
there is danger that creating a "kinder and gentler" corps of lawyers can be
13. The Professionalism of Judges and Lawyers website, a project of the University of South
Carolina School of Law's Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough Center on Professionalism, provides
links to various national, state, and local professionalism standards, codes, and creeds. See
http:l/wwv.law.sc.edulprofcenter/mainmaterials/dsppscc.htm (last visited Mar. 28, 2002).
14. See MONROE FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 16 (1990) (citing A.B.A.,
Standards Relating to the Defense Function 145-46 (Approved Draft, 1971)).
15. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS 66 (1962).
16. See Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade, 74 TEx. L.
REv. 259passim (1995); Amy R. Mashburn, Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and
Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657 passim (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, Opening Remarks:
Professionalism, Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at 467-71; Ronald D. Rotunda, Lawyers
and Professionalism: A Commentary on the Report of the American BarAssociation Commission on
Professionalism, 18 LoY.U.CHI. L.J. 1149passim (1987); Jay Sterling Silver, Professionalism andthe
Hidden Assault on the Adversarial Process, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 855, 869-70 (1994).
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accomplished only at the expense of stifling legitimate advocacy and client-
regarding representation, thus hanning clients of individual lawyers. 17 Nonetheless,
there is plainly some merit to the view that the public's perception of lawyers is
simply inaccurate-at least with respect to some aspects of lawyers' work.8 To the
17. See Hodes, Aim Better, supra note 6, at 1032 ("[I]t may be a dog-eat-dog world, but one dog
may eat another only according to the rules.") (quoting RobertJ. Kutak, The Adversary System andthe
Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER 172, 175 (David Luban ed., 1983)). "Some critics simply
disagree that service to clients through use of all legal means is morally inferior to client service that
takes into account the greater public good.... [and] that too vigorous a campaign for professionalism
and civility is but the first step towards legalization of the wrong norms." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.
& W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.6, at 1-12 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis omitted). When
powerful lawyers and judges "exhort other lawyers to engage only in conduct that they believe is
morally superior, the exhortations can have a coercive effect" Id. For example, there are troubling cases
where lawyers acted within the bounds of the rules of procedure and rules of ethics, but were
nonetheless chastised by the courts. Id. at 1-12 & n. 10 (citing Sprung v. Negwer Materials, Inc., 775
S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1989) as an example).
In Sprung, theplaintiffwas awarded a final defaultjudgementwhen, because ofa series ofclerical
errors, the defendant failed to serve an answer to the complaint or a request for extension of time. Id.
at n. 10 (citing Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 99-102). The plaintiff knew that the defendant believed that all
necessary answers had been filed, but the plaintiff directed his lawyer not to inform the defendant of
his mistake until after the deadline to file a motion to set aside the default. Id. (citing Sprung, 775
S.W.2d at 100-01). The defendant eventually filed the motion; however, the trial court refused to set
aside the default judgment and was upheld by a closely divided Missouri Supreme Court. Id. (citing
Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 99-102). The plaintiff's lawyer was chastised by the dissenting justices for
concealing the fact of default from the defendant. Id. (citing Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 105-06 (Robertson,
J., dissenting), 109-13 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting), 114-15 (Welliver, J., dissenting)). The dissenting
justices characterized this behaviorby theplaintiff's lawyer as "deceptive conductor deceptive silence"
which was the "the legal equivalent of fraud." Id. (citing Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at 110 (Blackmar, C.J.,
dissenting)). Chief Justice Blackmar stated:
I accept the proposition that a lawyer has a duty to advance his client's
interest by all honorable means, and would reject any suggestion that
"professional courtesy" should prevail over the lawyer's duty to his
client.... But I would stop short of taking advantage of a mistake known to me.
Id. (citing Sprung, 775 S.W.2d at I 10 (Blackmar, C.J., dissenting)) (emphasis omitted).
Justice Benham of the Georgia Supreme Court, fearing that every claim ofunprofessional conduct
would lead to a malpractice claim, opined: "Unbridled and blind advocacy could become the order of
the day and the professionalism movement.., would be dead in the water." Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan,
Grimes, &Dermer, P.C., 453 S.E.2d 719,722 (Ga. 1995) (Benham, J., concurring). Professor Monroe
Freedman responded saying that "it follows, of course, that the success of the professionalism
movement would leave zealous advocacy no less dead." Monroe Freedman, The Ethical Danger of
"Civility" and "'Professionalism," CRIM. JUST. J., Spring 1998, at 17, 18.
18. For example, it is rank and inexcusable lawyer-bashing to perceive lawyers as "dishonest" and
not to be trusted because they defend (and sometimes help set free) criminal defendants whom they
know to be factually guilty. If lawyers could not defend such clients, the rule of law and the system of
trial by jury would be overthrown, and an ad hoc, extra-constitutional system of "trial by lawyer"
substituted in its place.
Similarly, the views of people who claim that lawyers will do "anything" to advance a client's
cause should be given little weight, for they are no doubt generalizing from a very small base of
anecdotal information, some of it fictional to boot. More important, they are simply misinformed about
the extent to which existing rules regulating the conduct of lawyers puts certain conduct out of
bounds-such as lying, suborning perjury, fabricating evidence, and so on. See infra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
Unfortunately, it is not only lay people who harbor such peculiar views of the proper role of
[Vol. 53: 527
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extent that this is so, it would be wrong to pander to popular lawyer-bashing
sentiment; instead, public education about the nature of the legal system, and the
sometimes-unlovely role that lawyers legitimately play in it, can be a sound
component of a campaign to enhance public trust and confidence in the justice
system.
On the other hand, some bar leaders have come to realize that the public cannot
bear all of the blame for its mistrust of lawyers, and its perceptions cannot all be
dismissed as "clearly erroneous," to borrow a legal phrase. The disheartening
reality is that among lawyers-who once claimed honesty and integrity as their
stock-in-trade, and who once proudly asserted that their word was their bond-too
many are rightly seen as untrustworthy. Too many unscrupulous lawyers wrap
themselves in the flag of "zealous advocacy" in an attempt to justify dishonest
conduct that is actually prohibited by the rules regulating lawyer conduct. 9
These lawyers forget-or conveniently pretend to forget-that the watchword
of ethical practice is "zealousness within the bounds of law," and that practicing
according to "law" includes obedience to the rules of professional conduct and
other norms governing the work of lawyers,20 many of which already require
honesty and truthfulness.21
When clients, judges, and other lawyers encounter even a few instances of
lawyer dishonesty,' the system can descend into a spiral of mistrust and
lawyers. See Hodes, Aim Better, supra note 6, at 1029-30, 1042-50 (discussing the strain of lawyer-
bashing attitudes prevalent among some elite lawyers, including some judges and academics).
19. PRI has developed a resource book for use by local and state bar associations in their efforts
to mountprofessional reform campaigns along the lines suggested by PRI. NAT'LCONFERENCEOFBAR
PRESIDENTS PROF'L REFORM INrrIATIVE, ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION: PUTING THE
PROFESSIONALREFoRmINrAThvEToWORKNYouRBAR (2002) (unpublished, current version on file
with South Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION]. One
resource included in the book is a compendium of existing rules set out in the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that require honesty and candor of lawyers, even those involved in contested
litigation matters. Id. at tab 7. Immediately following that listing is a sampling of cases in which those
rules have actually been enforced, in disciplinary matters and in connection withprivate party litigation.
Id. at tab 8.
20. See HAZARD & HODES, supra note 17, at §§ 1.3, 6.2.
21. This is not to say that such rules cannot be strengthened, or that enforcement efforts cannot
be stepped up. One ofPRI's earliest projects was to present a package ofsuggested amendments to the
Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct along these lines to the American Bar Association Ethics 2000
Commission, which was tasked to revise the Rules as needed. PRI's submission is included in its
resource book. ENHANCING TRuST N THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19, at tab 9. The most
important proposals, which concerned whether the word "material" ought to be deleted from rules
prohibiting lawyers from making false statements of law or fact, are discussed below. See infra notes
52-53 and accompanying text.
22. One resource that PRI has been developing since its very inception is An Inventory of
Impediments to Lawyer Truthfulness and a Catalog ofIncentives to Lawyer Dishonesty, now divided
into fivesegments: dishonesty with respect to clients, dishonesty with respect to courts, dishonesty with
respect to other lawyers, dishonesty with respect to thepublic, and dishonesty in the law school context.
When it has been reduced to final form, itwill be included in the resource book that PRI has developed
for use by local and state bar associations. See ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra
note 19.
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inefficiency, as every point of consequence must be double-checked rather than
taken at face value.
As some bar presidents at the state and local levels began to point out in their
monthly columns, puffery in negotiation can blend into outright lying, exaggeration
of time spent on a client's matter can become outright theft when hours are
fabricated out of whole cloth, and not only must lawyers insist upon receiving
written confirmation of oral agreements, but they must check carefully to see that
the writing accurately states the agreement reached.'
The public's loss of faith in the legal professional, in other words, is not all a
matter of perception. It is in part a matter of reality, and something more than
public relations moves are needed to change the reality, so that perception will
eventually follow suit.
Early in 2000, the Professional Reform Initiative (PRI) was formed as a project
of the National Conference of Bar Presidents (NCBP),24 under a planning grant
from the Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, to move forward with
suggestions and programs that would take this more active approach to re-
establishing public trust and confidence in the justice system. Not coincidentally,
PRI's first project has been to emphasize a return to truthfulness and honesty as the
core of the profession's core values, on which all else depends.'
Put another way, PRI's ambitious first project is to promote a policy of zero
tolerance for lying throughout the legal profession-a prescription that some
members of the bar have found to be unduly strong medicine, both before and after
the launch of PRI. However, such reforms are needed not only to improve the
quality of justice in the United States, but also to nourish the long-term health of
the legal profession itself.
II. FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL REFORM INITIATIVE
Although the PRI was not formally established until early in 2000, its genesis
can be traced through several educational programs conducted by the NCBP during
the middle 1990s. Individuals in the organization who were working towards the
more direct and active kinds of reform efforts described earlier27 also established
working relationships with like-minded people in the Conference of Chief Justices,
23. Several of these columns have been reprinted in the resource book that PRI has developed for
use by local and state bar associations. ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19,
at tab 3.
24. The NCBP is an organization that includes the leaders of all state bar associations and many
of the larger city, county, and other local or regional bar associations. The membership of the bar
associations thus represented in the NCBP considerably outnumbers the membership of the ABA.
25. ENHANCING TRusT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19, at tab 1.
26. Id. At its initial planning session, held in Tucson, Arizona in April 2000, PRI discussed reform
efforts directed at other reasons for the public's loss of faith in the legal profession and in the justice
system, such as escalating costs, long delays, and disgust with the uncivil atmosphere prevailing in
many courtrooms. A consensus was quickly reached, however, that a campaign directed at eliminating
or reducing lawyer dishonesty and untrustworthiness deserved primacy.
27. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53: 527
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the National Center for State Courts, the American Bar Association Center for
Professional Responsibility, and the National Association of Bar Executives.
In particular, Atlanta lawyer Seaborn Jones, former President of the Atlanta Bar
Association and President of the NCBP for 1999, was responsible, along with
others on the NCBP Executive Council,28 for presenting a series of programs at the
organization's bi-annual meetings (which are always held in conjunction with the
annual and mid-year meetings of the ABA). At the mid-year meeting in Miami in
1995, for example, a program entitled The Practice of Law-What's Broken or
Bent: The Role of Bar Associations in the Repair Business,29 was presented, at
which many ideas that subsequently animated PRI were advanced.
That summer, at the annual meeting in Chicago, a follow-up program was
aimed at finding solutions for the problems identified at the Miami session, and in
1996, the dialogue within the NCBP continued in Orlando, at a program entitled
The Role ofthe Bar in Relation to the Profession, the Judiciary and the Community:
Movers and Shapers of Changes in the Legal and Judicial Systems or Increasingly
Irrelevant?°
As described in Part I of this Article, the response of the organized bar to
criticism of lawyers and lawyers' behavior has often been decidedly mixed. Not
surprisingly, therefore, the earliest efforts of what would later become PRI met with
the same mixed reaction.
Some bar leaders, including some in leadership positions in the NCBP, feared
that acknowledging a serious problem with untruthfulness by lawyers would merely
fan the flames of the society-wide lawyer bashing that was already rampant. Indeed,
they feared that even a positive campaign to strengthen and enforce existing rules
against lying might merely generate negative publicity and embarrassing headlines:
"Bar group admits lawyers are untrustworthy; campaign to curb lying lawyers
proposed." Anything other than rosy accounts oflawyerpro bonopublico activities
and other forms of public relations "cheerleading" were dismissed as "lawyer
bashing from within."
On the other hand, the NCBP programs were well attended and did not cause
any firestorm of protest among the nation's bar presidents. Even those not
immediately (or already) convinced of the need for long term and thorough reform
were willing to discuss the problems in a sober and clear-eyed fashion. Thus, more
than anything else, the NCBP sessions convinced the proponents of more active
reform that the bar can openly face up to whatever is valid in public criticism of the
28. Other active individuals included: David S. Houghton of Omaha, Nebraska, President-Elect
of the NCBP; Randall Cooper of North Conway, New Hampshire, NCBP Member-at-Large; and
Douglas Lang of Dallas, Texas, Secretary of the NCBP. All of these active participants in the earlier
NCBP programs later became members of PRI.
29. National Conference of Bar Presidents, The Practice of Law-What's Broken or Bent: The
Role of Bar Associations in the Repair Business (1995) (copy on file with author).
30. National Conference of Bar Presidents, The Role of the Bar in Relation to the Profession, the
Judiciary and the Community: Movers and Shapers of Changes in the Legal and Judicial Systems, or
Increasingly Irrelevant (1996) (copy on file with author).
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legal profession, the sky will not fall, and, more important, the hard work of reform
should move forward.
Accordingly, despite the doubts of some, the NCBP continued to sponsor such
programming, and to provide state and local bar presidents with food for thought
about serious reform efforts as they returned to their constituencies. For example,
Chief Justice Thomas Zlaket of Arizona, already a prominent voice of reform on
the Conference of Chief Justices,3 and a frequent and forceful speaker about the
problem of lack of truthfulness in the legal profession in particular, electrified the
NCBP audience at the August 1999 annual meeting in Atlanta.3" The interest and
enthusiasm generated by that speech was a major factor in the subsequent creation
of PRI.
Considering these and similar activities of other organizations, including the
Open Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, which had supported many
educational and other projects focusing on the American justice system, it is fair to
say that by the fall of 1999, there was significant interest in professional reform,
and some momentum generated in that direction as well. Accordingly, with
President Seabom Jones again taking the lead, the NCBP applied for a planning
grant from the Open Society Institute to establish the Professional Reform
Initiative.
The single most important point of the grant application was that because bar
presidents serve for only one year, a semi-permanent group dedicated to long-term
reform was needed to serve as a resource center and sounding board, so that reform-
minded presidents would not have to reinvent the wheel each time they came into
office. Instead, PRI would develop programs and materials that could be used to
31. Chief Justice Zlaket had been instrumental in convening the National Conference on Public
Trust and Confidence in the Justice System, which was held in May 1999 in Washington, D.C. See
supra note 10. One ofthe co-sponsors of that meeting was the Conference of ChiefJustices, which had
earlier issued a national plan of action on professionalism issues. CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, A
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON LAWYER CONDUCT AND PROFESSIONALISM, available at
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/ccj/natplan.htm (last visited Mar. 29,2002). The plan included discussion of
ways in which the bench, bar, and law school communities could coordinate efforts at both education
and enforcement to improve the performance of lawyers and the quality ofjustice in our legal system.
Id.
32. Later, Chief Justice Zlaket became a founding member of PRI and one of its most active
participants and spokesmen. See, e.g., Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at 491-94, 533-35
(faulting, equally, "a profession in denial" about the extent to which lawyers lie in everyday practice,
and judges too disengaged or too timid to do anything about it). In addition, he made a further
presentation to an NCBP audience at the 2000 mid-year meeting in Dallas, Texas, excerpts of which
have been included on a videotape that PRI has available for use by local bar associations.
Lawyer and cultural anthropologist Roberta Katz also became a founding member of PRI. Her
1997 book had pinpointed lack of truthfulness as one of the chief factors leading to the breakdown of
the American adversary system. See ROBERTAKATZ, JUSTICEMATERS: RESCUINGTHELEGAL SYSTEM
FORTHETWENTY-FIRsTCENTURY 43-46 (1997). Her talk to an NCBP Plenary Session at the 2001 mid-
year meeting in San Diego was entitled Truthfulness-Lawyers' Stock and Trade. Roberta Katz,
Address at National Conference of Bar Presidents, Mid-Year Meeting in San Diego, California (2001)
(copy on file with author). Some of her later comments were filmed and included in PRI's educational
videotape.
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encourage or advance local reform efforts, with or without further modification to
fit local conditions.
Moreover, because the proposed PRI would include representatives from other
segments of the legal profession, such as the judiciary and the legal academy, as
well as lay participation, not only would the best thinking be brought to bear on the
long-term issues that PRI wanted to tackle, but it would have access to available
resources across a broad spectrum.3
The Open Society Institute approved the initial startup grant (and later extended
funding to cover activity at least through 2002). It was then up to PRI to decide
which reform efforts to tackle first, and through what means. Meeting in Tucson,
Arizona, in April 2000, the founding members of PRI quickly determined that the
first project would involve a single-issue campaign to eliminate or significantly
reduce dishonesty and untruthfulness among lawyers in their professional conduct.
Several grounds were advanced for this choice, besides the fact that, as
described above, the NCBP programs that had led to the formation of PRI had
already focused attention on the issue. First, the participants agreed that some
lawyers' disregard for the truth is a major factor in the public's current disrespect
for lawyers and thus for the justice system itself. That reality had to be met head-on
and radically altered in order to restore the public's trust; public relations and public
education campaigns, while not unwelcome, would always be insufficient without
significant actual change in lawyer behavior.
Second, not only is being lied to disheartening, wearisome, and wasteful of
both time and energy, but being a lawyer who feels compelled to lie is so corrosive
to the spirit that it must be part of the professional discontent experienced by so
many lawyers at all stages of their respective careers. Third, restoring trust to the
legal system and trustworthiness to lawyers is necessary not only to the
maintenance ofan independent legal profession, but also to its very survival. Unless
the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or later government agencies will
remove the unique measure of self-regulation granted to the legal profession and
step in to clean it for us. 4
PRI also quickly reached consensus about how it would attempt to accomplish
its goal. There was initial agreement that little progress could be made without
significantly enhanced enforcement by the courts and disciplinary agencies of
33. In addition to the several persons already named as having been founding members of PRI
in notes 28 and 32, supra, the original group also included Judge Sandra Lynch of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, former ABA President William Ide, Charlotte (Becky) Stretch
of the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, who was also a member of the Ethics 2000
Commission and had close ties to the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism, and retired
businessman James Steele of Boise, Idaho. When I was engaged as the Reporter for PRI in the spring
of 200l, I was no longer an academic, having returned to private practice, but I had had some twenty
years of experience as an academic in the field of legal ethics and "the law of lawyering," and my new
practice was limited almost exclusively to that area, in any event.
34. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding
Professional Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1229,
1230-33, 1267-76 (1995) (arguing an approach that would substitute government regulation for self-
regulation).
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existing norms providing for truthfulness, but that the judiciary--especially where
it is elected-could not in turn make progress without support and encouragement
from the local bar associations. This meant that PRI would have to convince key
elements in the organized bar and the judiciary that the problem of lying by lawyers
was both real and serious, and that it was in the interests of both to dedicate
significant resources to eliminating the problem.
At the same time, a concerted effort would have to be made to change the
baseline culture in which individual lawyers operate. Thus, while dedicated service
to clients, including zealous advocacy, is commendable, lawyers must remember
that this is to be accomplished within the bounds of law, which means without
falsehood.3" This also suggested that a major component of PRI's work would be
outreach efforts to the law school community, to help ensure that young lawyers
entering the profession would have a proper understanding of the role of
truthfulness in lawyering, and would internalize this key professional value.
For the rest of 2000 and through the end of 2001, PRI concentrated its efforts
on three main projects to advance its agenda. First, PRI made a submission to the
Ethics 2000 Commission, suggesting amendments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct conducive to enhancing truthfulness among lawyers.36
Second, PRI developed and continually updated and re-issued a resource book that
could be used by bar leaders, members of the judiciary, and law school personnel
interested in mounting a reform effort along the lines advocated by PRI.37
The book includes material on oaths for admission to the bar stressing
truthfulness and honesty, examples of cases enforcing existing rules against lying,
both in disciplinary matters and in private party litigation, and a recommended pre-
trial charge to lawyers and litigants regarding the value of truth in the courtroom.3"
Finally, through Internet contacts, outside speaking engagements, presentation
of further programs at NCBP meetings, and other outreach efforts, PRI has
encouraged the establishment of several pilot projects at both the state and local
levels. People associated with these projects have in turn begun to bring their
experiences back to PRI, so that PRI can serve its clearinghouse function and
further advance such reforms.
III. HONING PRI's MESSAGE AND WRITING ITS RESOURCE BOOK: CHARTING THE
DISTINC'ION BETWEEN LYING, MISREPRESENTATION, AND MISLEADING, WHILE
SOLVING THE EASTER BUNNY PROBLEM
From the moment that the PRI determined to make restoration of lawyers'
reputation for truthfulness and honesty its signature issue,39 it was destined to face
35. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text for discussion of existing rules against lawyer
dishonesty, and PRI's attempts to strengthen them and ensure more vigorous enforcement.
36. See infra notes 46 and 53 and accompanying text.
37. ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19.
38. Id. at tabs 5, 8, & 10.
39. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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a series of tactical or "political" issues, as well as several challenging substantive
issues that go to the very heart of defining what it means-or ought to mean-to
be a lawyer functioning in the American legal system today.
As described earlier in the Article, PRI had met vigorous opposition from a few
bar leaders to its whole project, even during its formative period. When PRI began
to engage in significant outreach efforts, it had a burden of persuasion to overcome
not only in those quarters, however, but also with respect to lawyers and lay people
hearing about the project for the first time.
Always at some risk of being charged with protesting too much, PRI had to
convince doubters that it was not trying to add fuel to the lawyer-bashing fire, but
was instead trying to enhance the reputation of lawyers generally by working to
restore truthfulness and honesty as the core values most clearly associated with the
legal profession. The ultimate goal, after all, was to make convincing once again the
traditional lawyer adage "my word is my bond," thus increasing public trust and
confidence in the justice system.'
In this connection, PRI had to toe a delicate line in the work product that it put
out for public consumption. On the one hand, PRI members believed (and insisted)
that some nontrivial percentage of lawyers really do lie about nontrivial matters,
that this phenomenon cannot be ignored, and that it is a sufficiently serious problem
to require the systematic and long-term attention of the organized bar. On the other
hand, it would be counter-productive--not to mention entirely incorrect-for PRI
to leave its intended audience with the impression that lying by lawyers is a
"natural" condition, built-in to the very concept of being a lawyer. That was the
unfunny, untrue, and repellent premise of the film Liar Liar,4 a premise wholly at
odds with PRI's view.
A good example of how PRI refined its message in this regard may be found
in the Introduction to the resource book that PRI has developed (and still continues
to develop) as a major element of its outreach effort to state and local bar
associations, the judiciary, and law school groups.42 The Introduction carries the
40. It will be recalled that one of the prime movers of the National Conference on Public Trust
and Confidence in the Justice System, which was held in May 1999 in Washington, D.C, was Chief
Justice Thomas ZlaketofArizona, a founding member of PRI and one ofits chiefspokesmen. Seesupra
notes 31-32. The PRI resource book refers to a simple example often used by Chief Justice Zlaket to
illustrate this point: "[T]here was a time when an agreement between lawyers over the phone neverhad
to be confirmed in writing, whereas today it is routine." ENHANCING TRUSTINTHE LEGAL PROFESSION,
supra note 19, at tab 1.
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. ENHANCING TRUSTIN THELEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19, at tab 1. The resource book first
appeared in public essentially as an agenda and a limited set of materials to accompany the PRI
presentation at the mid-year meeting of the National Conference of Bar Presidents in San Diego in
February 2001. At that meeting, PRIpresented a majorplenary session address on the corrosive effects
of lying, by PRI member Dr. Roberta Katz, and then continued with a panel discussion on how local
bar presidents might begin to advance reforms of the type PRI advocated.
By the annual meeting, heldin Chicago inAugust2001, the resourcebook hadbeen substantially
reworked, and consisted of a long introduction and several appendices or "tabs," collecting materials
(such as cases, relevant rules ofprofessional conduct, and columns by bar leaders in local barjournals)
that could be used to illustrate or validate PRI's positions. ENHANCING TRusT IN THE LEGAL
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subtitle "The Professional Reform Initiative's First Project: Increasing Public
Trust and Confidence in the Justice System by Emphasizing Truthfulness and
Honesty as the Lawyers' Stock-in-Trade," and contains the following passage:
PRI's emphasis on honesty in lawyering treats seriously the
complaint of many observers, both from within and without the
profession, that the incidence of lawyer dishonesty is on the rise.
But PRI's project has nothing in common with lawyer-bashing
efforts so pervasive in the culture at large. To the contrary, our
goal is to impress upon the judiciary and the public the value that
the profession, through its bar associations, places upon
truthfulness and honesty.
In other words, despite the assumptions of some members of
the public, and despite the claim of a small minority of ethically
challenged lawyers, lying is not an accepted element of
lawyering. To the contrary, existing rules ofprofessional conduct
are crowded with provisions requiring honesty and candor, even
as applied to lawyers participating in litigation or other
adversarial representation.3 Moreover, in many states the oaths
of office that newly admitted attomey[s] take include[] specific
reference to a duty of honesty and truthfulness.'
To be sure, the rules against lawyer dishonesty are not as
sharp and unequivocal as they might be, enforcement has been
spotty, and sanctions have not always been as stem as they should
be in order to achieve deterrence and to remind the public that
untruthfulness is indeed antithetical to the legal profession.45 But
PRI and others, including bar leaders, judges, and academics,
have worked to strengthen the rules, and to encourage more and
better enforcement.46
PROFESSION, supra note 19.
43. At this point, a footnote in the resource book Introduction refers to a tab listing current rules
of professional conduct requiring truthfulness and honesty in lawyering, such as Model Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.3(a), 3.4,4.1, and 8.4(c). ENHANCINGTRUSTINTHELEGALPROFESSION, SUpra
note 19, at tab I n.2 (citing ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19, tab 7).
44. Another tab in the resourcebook provides brief treatment ofoaths upon admission, noting that
while many include a component requiring truthfulness and honesty, many others make reference to
a series of vague, subjective, and sometimes internally inconsistent values. Id. at tab 10. In the first
editions of the resource book, PRI simply recommended that bar associations work with the highest
court in their respective states to include or strengthen language about truthfulness and honesty, and
provided some promising illustrative language.
45. At this point, a footnote to the Introduction stated, "Uneven and insufficiently vigorous
enforcement does not mean that the rules are a nullity, however." Id. at tab I n.4. Another tab in the
resource book provides examples of cases in which the rules have been enforced, both in disciplinary
matters and in private party litigation. Id. at tab 8.
46. Id. at tab 1. Here, a footnote to the Introduction noted that PRI has made suggestions for
strengthening enforcement action, and that with respect to strengthening the content of the rules, PRI
had made several recommendations to the Ethics 2000 Commission. Id. at tab I n.5. An excerpted copy
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In a nutshell, the tactical problem PRI faced was to negotiate the shoals lying
between a clear-eyed analysis that did not shrink from real problems and alarming
bar leaders into stunned inaction.47 In effect, paraphrasing the famous line from the
Jack Nicholson filmA Few GoodMen,8 PRI was asking the organized bar whether
it could "handle the truth" about the truthfulness ofAmerican lawyers.49
Beyond the necessarily tactical or "political" positioning just described,
surprisingly difficult substantive issues arose at every turn-issues on which PRI
easily reached consensus with respect to the broad outlines, but on which subtle
differences remained. In other words, even assuming that PRI had been ceded
complete freedom to establish the regulatory regime that it thought best, the devil
would stillpersist in the details. Moreover, concern about how different approaches
would be perceivedby PRI's intended audience may have in turn further influenced
how individuals within PRI sought to shape the answers to these tough questions
that PRI would present to the organized bar and to the public at large.
As described below, PRI's modus operandi has been to put the most difficult
philosophical and jurisprudential issues temporarily to one side and concentrate
most of its fire right down the middle, where there is broad agreement-not only
within PRI, but also in the bar generally.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to sample some of the issues thus temporarily
sidetracked, not least because they are frequently referred to by persons expressing
genuine interest in PRI's work. Indeed, the interplay between the short-term need
to put forward a manageable program for reform, and the long-term need to
contribute to solutions of these dicey issues helped shape the work product that PRI
actually put out into the public domain. Consider, for example, the baseline
problem of defining "lying" itself.
Certainly, there is strong emotional appeal to a stated policy of zero tolerance
for lying, coupled with a broad definition of lying. There is also an attractive
straightforwardness in refusing to allow for distinctions between active and passive
lying, or to permit exceptions for other practices that involve misdirection and
of those recommendations was added to a later version of the resource book. Id. at tab 9.
47. In a subsection to the Introduction of the PRI resource book titled The Size of the Problem,
this passage appears:
For those at the other end of the spectrum[,) those who believe that this
problem is too big or too tough to be tackled successfully[,] we say take heart.
The work before you is not nearly so formidable as improving public education
or reducing illegal drug usage and associated problems. You can reach.., a
limited group made up of intelligent people, the great majority of whom favor
honesty and truthfulness. With the right leadership and a group that dedicates
itself to the proposition that honesty and truthfulness are essential to the well-
being of our profession and public respect for it, you can bring about positive
change. It will take time, but you can do it.
ENHANCING TRusT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 19, at tab 1.
48. A FEW GOOD MEN (Columbia Tristar 1992).
49. See the column of the 2001 Kansas Bar Association president, James Bush, using the same
Nicholson line in a slightly different sense, but still referring (favorably) to the PRI project. Mr. Bush
wondered whether lawyers generally could "handle the truth" in their dailypractice. James L. Bush,
Truth, Justice, and the American Way, J. KAN. B. AsS'N, Oct. 2001, at 2.
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misleading rather than deliberate falsehood or misrepresentation in the legal sense.
In his speeches on behalf of PRI, for example, Chief Justice Thomas Ztaket of the
Arizona Supreme Court typically dismisses such distinctions with scorn, claiming
that any child above the age of five can instantly spot a lie.5"
On the other hand, some of the most fervent foes of lying by lawyers maintain
that a sensible and workable ban on lying cannot exist without treating such
nuances seriously." A simple illustration of these different approaches involves the
common example of zero-sum bargaining, as in lawsuit settlement negotiations.
Chief Justice Zlaket is correct that lying in response to a direct question
regarding settlement authority is unacceptable, and everyone within PRI agrees.
Moreover, although such a lie is prohibited under existing rules of professional
conduct,52 the prohibition is notoriously weak, and PRI is not alone in calling to
have it strengthened. 3 Yet, if anything (or everything) other than an immediate and
50. Excepts of some of these speeches have been included on a videotape that PRI has available
for useby local bar associations. The videotape-still awork in progress-has been distributed to many
bar leaders, and more copies will be made available when it is completed.
51. See Hodes, Aim Better, supra note 6, at 1029-42.
52. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 4.1 (2001) ("In the course of representing
a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person.").
53. Until 2002, the Comment to Rule 4.1 (a) said the following about what counts as a fact (and
therefore a lie about a fact) in the context of negotiations:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not
taken as statements ofmaterial fact. Estimates ofprice or value... [or settlement
expectations] are in this category."
Id. R. 4.1, cmt. [2] (2001).
The Ethics 2000 Commission received numerous submissions requesting that this language be
replaced by language making it clear that direct lies (about nontrivial matters) in negotiation always
violate Rule 4.1 (a). In its November 2000 Report, however, the Commission merely recommended
adding the word "ordinarily" a second time-in the last sentence quoted above. A.B.A., COMM. ON
ETHIcs 2000, EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: REPORT WITH
RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (2001), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2002) [hereinafter ETHics 2000 COMM.
REPORT]. The Commission also proposed adding a helpful sentence at the end of this Comment,
reminding lawyers of their obligations under the law of criminal and civil misrepresentation, which
presumably was a reminder that this law continues to be in flux, and in many jurisdictions includes a
prohibition on omitting information necessary to make a statement not misleading when taken as a
whole. Id., available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethics2k.html (last visited Mar. 29,2002). Both of
these recommendations were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates at the mid-year meeting held in
Philadelphia in February 2002.
In PRI's March 2001 submission to the Ethics 2000 Commission, however, it proposed a
completely revamped Comment [2], challenging existing conventions of negotiation, and urging that
lawyers take the lead in modeling new "rules ofthe game" thatmight have an uplifting effect on society
generally:
This Rule refers to statements offact. Whether a particular statement should
be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under previously
accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements were not taken
as statements ofmaterial fact, presupposingparticipants equal in sophistication
and knowledge of the conventions of the market place, and of society's moral
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truthful answer counted as a prohibited "lie," then no negotiation session could last
longer than one minute (and poker would cease to hold any interest for players
above the age of six).
Instead, just as good poker players do not show their hole cards until the other
players have paid to see it, good negotiators do not give up-let alone
volunteer-information without receiving some information in exchange. They
have developed a variety of techniques by which to avoid answering-and thus
also to avoid lying. They meet a question with another, or (temporarily) change the
subject, but their purpose is to create afalse impression of exactly where they want
the negotiation to come to closure. 4
Another telling example arises from the classic debate over whether it ought
to be permissible (or perhaps even mandatory) for a lawyer to cross-examine a
witness who is known (to the lawyer) to be telling the truth. A lawyer who does so
is obviously trying to lead the trier-of-fact to come to a false conclusion about a
factual matter, yet the lawyer is not making any statements, let alone false
statements. Is this practice, which is common in both criminal and civil matters,
so obviously "lying" that a child of five would recognize it as such, or is it part of
legitimate advocacy precisely because there is no lying at all, "only"
misdirection?"5
repugnance towards lying as a general proposition. Because these
presuppositions are not always operative, the burden should be on the attorney
to disclose when a statement is an opinion such as estimates of price or value
placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable
settlement of a claim. Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under
applicable law to avoid misrepresentation, including fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation.
Letter from W. William Hodes, Esq., Reporter, The Professional Reform Initiative, to American Bar
Association Ethics 2000 Commission (Mar. 12, 2001) (copy on file with the South Carolina Law
Review).
54. See, e.g., Martin Latz, Truth, Strategy Can be Tough Elements to Mix, Bus. J. OF PHOENIX,
Jan. 4, 2002, at 28 (discussing how to "effectively block and avoid answering strategically critical
questions and still be truthful"). Mr. Latz is an Adjunct Professor of Negotiation at Arizona State
University College of Law, the negotiations columnist for The Business Journal, and the owner of the
Latz Negotiation Institute.
55. This issue has been well-debated in the literature. See HAZARD &HODES, supra note 17, at
§ 40.3, which includes discussion ofthe bestknown exchangein the criminal lawcontext. See generally
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: Response to Professor Subin s
Position on the Criminal Lawyer's "Different Mission," 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICs 339, 343-46 (1987)
(arguing that even when a defense attorney knows his client is guilty, he still may suggest to the jury
areas where reasonable doubt may exist); Harry I. Subin, The CriminalLawyer's "Different Mission":
Reflections on the "Right" to Present a False Case, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 125, 149-52 (1987)
(concluding that a criminal defense attorney who knows the truth ofa fact established in the state's case
should not attempt to contest that factby impeachment, other evidence, or arguments); Harry I. Subin,
Is This Lie Necessary? Further Reflections on the Right to Present a False Defense, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 629, 689-90 (1988) (conceding that even when defense attorneys know the prosecution's
evidence is true, they may nonetheless test the weight of the evidence by offering alternative
explanations of the fact).
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How one answers that and similar questions5 6 depends almost entirely upon
whether one accepts or rejects the basic tenets of the American adversary system.57
It is not surprising, therefore, to find that members of PRI have differing views on
these most fundamental issues, even while they share a firm commitment to
exposing and eliminating the lack of truthfulness among lawyers in the "down-the-
middle" cases where virtually everyone would agree that "real lies" are at issue.
As the PRI continued developing its outreach materials, substantive
disagreement about the problem of dishonesty by lawyers and how to deal with it
turned on two other axes as well, in addition to the problem of defining what
"counts" as a lie, as discussed above.
First, should PRI insist that the professional obligation must be to refrain from
all lying, or should "zero tolerance for lying" apply only to such lying as is
"material," or perhaps some intermediate standard, such as lying about "non-trivial"
matters should apply? Second, should PRI recognize situational exceptions--such
as exigent circumstances-to its proposed zero-tolerance policy? Or would these
prove to be slippery slopes without a plausible toe-hold?
Existing rules governing lawyer conduct typically prohibit direct lies by
lawyers, but the prohibition typically only applies to falsehoods that are "material."
Prior to 2002, for example, Model Rule 3.3(a), for example, stated that a lawyer
"shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal,"58
and Rule 4.1 (a) extended the same ban for the benefit of third persons. 9 The clear
implication of this language is that lying is permissible in both instances if the lie
in question concerns something that is not material.
There has been persistent criticism that this way of stating the rule is too mild,
and PRI was among the many groups and individuals supporting the Ethics 2000
56. Consider, for example, the well-known Opinion CI-1 164 of the Michigan State Bar
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, available at http://www.michbar.orglopinionslethics/
numbered opinions/ci- 1164.htmil (last visited Mar. 29,2002) and discussed atHAZARD&HoDEs,supra
note 17, illus. 29-5, as well as in Murray L. Schwartz, On Making the True LookFalse and the False
Look True, 41 Sw. L.J. 1135, 1145-47 (1988).
According to the Michigan Opinion, where the victim of a robbery was mistaken about the time
of the crime, and the factually guilty defendant had a solid alibi for the wrong time, it was not unethical
for defense counsel to present the truthful alibi, even though this might have the effect of leading the
jury further from the ultimate truth, rather than closer to it. Mich. State Bar Comm. on Prof'l & Jud.
Ethics, Op. C-I 164, available at http://www.michbar.org/opinions/ethics/numberedopinion/ci-
I 164.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2002).
57. Compare Hodes, Aim Better, supra note 6, at 1033-34 ("So long as they do not rely on false
or fabricated testimony, lawyers may 'spin' in closing argument whatever alternative theories of the
case they choose.") with Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 38-39 (1996) (suggesting that we could
"prohibit the cross... examination of witnesses 'known' to the lawyer to be telling th truth and prohibit
thepresentation ofany evidence at all 'known' to be false by the attorney"), andJohn A. Humbach, The
NationalAssociation ofHonest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, "Lawyer Honesty" and Public Trust
in the Legal System, 20 PAcEL. REV. 93 (1999) ("The lawyer's skill is to weave stories that are false
out of statements that are true.").
58. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2001).
59. Id.R. 4.1(a) (2001).
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Commission when it recommended deleting the word from Rule 3.3(a) in its
November 2000 Report to the ABA.6" Interestingly, however, the Ethics 2000
Commission recommended retaining the materiality requirement in Rule 4.1(a)
when someone other than a tribunal is being lied to,6' and PRI did not object
(although it is possible that this was an oversight due to the press of time).
This suggests that there is the additional difficulty that a definition of
"materiality" in this context is not self-evident.6' Moreover, even PRI, with its
battle cry of "zero tolerance for lying," may have sensed that in the real world a
total ban on all falsehood is unworkable, at least so far as drafting a binding rule of
conduct is concerned.
Thus, when a lawyer is not under the formal strictures of rules of court, it
perhaps ought to be left to social mores rather than professional ethics to decide
what to do about lawyers who lie about whether they are available to take a phone
call, whether an opposing client is having a bad hair day, or whether the Easter
Bunny really exists. However, in court no lie is immaterial, and virtually none are
trivial,63 because even a lie about vacation plans or a copy machine malfunction can
adversely affect the smooth functioning of the judicial system.
Finally, there is a subset of situations in which real lying is at hand, the lies are
without doubt of real substance, but justifications are offered that have some
plausibility. Typically, these situations involve unusual or exigent facts, and the
proffered justification is that a lie is preferable, both legally and morally, to the
available alternatives." Moreover, these situations typically lead to heated (and
60. ETHics 2000 COMM. REPORT, supra note 53. In February 2002, the ABA House of Delegates
adopted this recommendation.
61. Id. The ABA House of Delegates also adopted this recommendation in February 2002.
62. Compare Chauncey M. DePree, Jr. & Rebecca K. Jude, The MaterialityPrecept in theLegal
Profession's Rules of Conduct, PROF. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 10 (arguing that there is potential for abuse
in the application ofRule 3.3 (a)(1) and supporting a recommendation that the rule be modified to read
that "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal."), with W.
William Hodes, Two CheersforLying (About ImmaterialMatters), PROF. LAW., May 1994, at 1. In the
latter article, I agreed with the authors of the first article that lawyers should not be allowed to lie to
courts about "material" matters, but disagreed that the examples they used to criticize existing Rule 3.3
involved anything less than material lies. Id. at 4.
More important, I argued that the confidentiality principle and both client and lawyer autonomy
ought to trump the duty ofcandorto the court with respect to trivial matters that have no bearing on the
issues before the court, and thatthe "materiality" conceptcould be retained in therule languagewithout
harming the system. Id. at 6. 1 now see, however, that the word "material" carries too much baggage
from the criminal law context and from the law of fraud and misrepresentation, and that the intended
dividing line is better described by a word such as "nontrivial."
63. See supra note 62.
64. A favoritequestion of lawprofessors and moral philosophers asks what should be the proper
response if Nazi storm troopers demand to know if any Jews are hiding in the basement. See, e.g.,
Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at 536 (comments by Rob Atkinson, Professor of Law,
Florida State University College of Law). When a lawyer is acting in a private capacity, the proper
response is surely thatalie is mandatory, but the solution to this problem would be more difficult if the
lawyerwere somehow to be asked the question in a formal setting within the Americanjudicialsystem.
See also Professionalism Symposium, supra note 1, at 538-39 (comments by Jack Lee Sammons,
Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School). Professor Sammons, in response to Professor
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evenly matched) discussions among lawyers and scholars about what the rules say
and ought to say-which is exactly why the PRI has temporarily banished them to
the sidelines for purposes of its "down-the-middle" outreach efforts.
Most recent examples have involved possible application of rules such as
Model Rule 8.4(c), which prohibits "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation,"6 rather than the rules discussed earlier that directly prohibit
lying.66 In one celebrated case, a maniac who had already killed several people with
an axe told the police (via a mobile phone) that he would surrender if provided with
a lawyer.67 Otherwise, he would continue his killing spree.6" A prosecuting attorney
secured the man's surrender by pretending to be from the local public defender's
office.69
In another case, the Oregon Supreme Court ruled that it was unethical for a
lawyer to impersonate a doctor in order to gather evidence about possible fraud by
Atkinson's example, stated:
I may surprise [other participants] here because I think lawyers have a unique
obligation towards honesty, one that is far more demanding than the honesty of
ordinary morality. In other words, if Rob's Nazis were at the door of a lawyer and
the conversations with them were part ofthe legal conversation, then Kant got the
answer fight. The reasons for this, however, are not Kant's reasons. The primary
reason is that dishonesty is more destructive of the quality of the legal
conversation than anything else, and the quality of that conversation is the
primary good carried by ourpractice. In other words, honesty is a constitutive rule
of our practice; we do not have a practice without it. When we are dishonest, we
foul our own nest.
Id.
Onepractical response to this particular version of the problem ofexigenteircumstances is simply
to put the debate aside as purely theoretical, and take comfort in the fact that real world reformers
cannot encounter this difficulty in contemporary America. But see ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE
ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PRoCESS (1975), for a haunting account of the struggle
between dedicated nineteenth century abolitionists over the best way to deal with the federal Fugitive
Slave Laws, which had repeatedly been upheld by the United States Supreme Court as constitutional.
One group insisted thatthe only moral course was to seekto become appointed as commissioners under
the laws and deliberatelyflout them, refusing to order the return of slaves to Southern states, even when
there was no defense under the law. Id. at 184-85. Another group insisted that such lawlessness would
hurt the abolitionist cause in the long run and that it would bebetter to work within the political system
to achieve repeal of these hated laws. Id. at 175-78.
Although the moral dilemmas arising from either the "Jews in the basement" example or the
problem of fugitive slaves cannot arise today, itmustbe noted thatsimilar crises ofconscience can arise
for some lawyers in the specific context ofright-to-life versus right-to-choose litigation. Although they
are in a distinct minority, some lawyers equate contemporary Supreme Court jurisprudence flowing
from Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) with the fugitive slave law cases that Professor Cover wrote
about. Forthese lawyers, the legal system itselfis morallybankrupt (in this limited area) and not entitled
to command obedience to its doctrines in the ordinary way.
65. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2001).
66. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
67. People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 576 (Colo. 2001) (holding that a prosecuting attorney's
knowing and intentional actions to deceive the maniac into believing that the attorney was a public
defender violated Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(c)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 577.
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a medical review company, 70 but then stunned the federal and local law
enforcement community by going out of its way to confirm that this principle
applied to ordinary undercover operations as well, if they were conducted with the
assistance of licensed lawyers. 1 Similar arguments have been made, pro and con,
in the case of discrimination "testers," who, with the help of their lawyers, pretend
to want to engage in certain activities, such as buying a house, to see if they will be
discriminated against.7"
IV. CONCLUSION: THE PROFESSIONAL REFORM INITIATIVE BEGINS TO GAIN
ACCEPTANCE AND MOMENTUM-RIGHT DOWN THE MIDDLE
As described earlier in this Article,73 the PRI was initiated by a small group of
reform-minded individuals within the NCBP, but did not win universal support
within that group. To the contrary, some viewed with alarm NCBP programs that
acknowledged that some of the public's criticisms of lawyers had validity.
Moreover, there continue to be bar leaders whose preferred response to public
criticism is to mount public education campaigns about the positive but often
misunderstoodrole that lawyers play in society, orpublic relations campaigns about
the good works that lawyers perform.
Gradually, however, the NCBP began to present programs that seriously treated
the notion that lack of trustworthiness in lawyers is not merely aperceivedproblem,
it is part reality as well. Early in 2000, PRI was formed under a grant from the Open
Society Institute of the Soros Foundation, and began to develop an outreach
program to state and local bar associations, members of the judiciary, and the law
school community. In addition to presentation of more informational programs at
NCBP annual and mid-year meetings, PRI also began to develop backup resources
that could be turned over to constituent groups to aid in their reform efforts.74
Because of lingering doubts and concerns that some expressed about PRI's
project, and because some peripheral issues were too complex (and perhaps too
divisive) to be embraced by a group just finding its balance, a tactical compromise
was reached to focus first on the situations in which there is more easily an
70. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 973-74 (Or. 2000).
71. Id. at 979-80. The Oregon Supreme Court has now adopted a total revision of this part of its
rules, which would specifically allow this type of deception, in both civil and criminal cases, if the
lawyerhas legitimate purposes for conducting these covert activities. See Oregon AmendsDisciplinary
Rule to Clarify That Lawyers May Supervise Covert Activity, 18 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 94 (2002).
72. See, in the criminal law context, Christopher J. Shine, Note, Deception and Lawyers: Away
from a Dogmatic Principle and Toward a Moral Understanding ofDeception, 64NoTREDAMEL.REv.
722 (1989). With respect to argument over the legitimacy of discrimination "testing," see David B.
Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for Deception by Undercover
Investigators andDiscrimination Testers: An Analysis ofthe Provisions ProhibitingMisrepresentation
Underthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 8 GEo. J.LEGAL ETHIcs 791 (1995). As noted in note
71, supra, the Oregon Supreme Court recently approved amendments to the Oregon Rules of
Professional Conduct that would permit good faith lawyer participation in such "testing" activities.
73. See supra Parts 1, I.
74. See supra Part III.
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agreement that lying is unacceptable, and only later to branch out to address the
more subtle issues that sometimes arise in practice.
As PRI's second full year of operation came to a close at the end of 2001, it
was able to report real success in breaking through the inertia that often greets a
new venture. Audiences at NCBP meetings were less inclined to worry that openly
talking about problems within the profession would further damage its image and
more inclined to ask for information about how to begin their own reform efforts.
Well over a hundred bar leaders attended the last two PRI sessions held at
NCBP meetings and took back to their bar associations copies of the resource book
that PRI has gradually developed, and many more have received copies by mail.
The video tape featuring excerpts from speeches by Chief Justice Thomas Zlaket
and lawyer and social anthropologist Roberta Katz-still a work in progress-has
been distributed to many bar leaders, and more copies will be made available when
it is completed with the addition of academic voices and other material from
contemporary films and television programs." PRI members have made several
presentations at local and regional bar meetings.
Most important, several bar associations have reported that they are or will be
taking up PRI's first initiative as their own, emphasizing truthfulness and honesty
as essential values of the legal profession. These include state bars in Alabama,
Colorado, Illinois, Nebraska, and Montana, and local bars in Atlanta, Dallas, Fort
Worth, and Long Beach, California.
The Colorado State Bar has moved faster and farther in that direction than other
bars, and its efforts, including the establishment of a statewide Professional Reform
Task Force, were highlighted at the PRI workshop at the NCBP mid-year meeting
held in Philadelphia in February 2002.76
Slowly but surely, the PRI is beginning to have an impact on the way that
American lawyers think about the reality of their relationship to truth and honesty.
If they fird that reality is not as attractive as it should be, then the next step must
be to change current realities, so that truthfulness and honesty once again become
the lawyers' stock-in-trade, the very basis of the core values defining what it means
to be a lawyer. And when that reality begins to change, it goes without saying that
public perception will follow closely behind.
75. See supra notes 32, 50.
76. When 2001-2002 Colorado State Bar Association President Laird T. Milburn took office, he
announced the formation ofa Professional Reform TaskForce, tobe chaired by outgoing PresidentDale
R. Harris. See Laird T. Milburn, Professional Reform, COLO. LAW., July 2001, at 51. During his
presidency, in turn, the latter had expressed interest in the issues raised by PRI. See Dale R. Harris, Do
Lawyers Lie?, COLO. LAW., Sept. 2000, at 19. Both of these articles are included in the resource book
provided to state and local bar associations by PRI. See ENHANCING TRUST IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION,
supra note 19, tab 3.
The Colorado Professional Reform Task Force includes some seventy-five members, drawn from
all geographical areas of the state, and all practice areas. In addition to practicing lawyers, the Task
Force includes trial and appellate judges, representatives from Colorado's two law schools, and
members of the public. The Task Force subdivided itself into five smaller groups, one each to look into
impediments to truthfulness and incentives to dishonesty (1) with respect to clients, (2) with respect to
courts and other tribunals, (3) with respect to fellow lawyers, (4) with respect to the public at large, and
(5) within the law school community. It is anticipated that the Task Force will issue its report to the
Colorado Bar Association in the spring or early summer of 2002.
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